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INTRODUCTION

The life blood of any institution of higher education is a talented student body, which must be continually replenished as students graduate.
Similarly, a university's athletic program needs a steady supply of talented
athletes to be successful. Hence, throughout higher education, universities
vigorously compete among themselves in many respects to attract the best
students and athletes to their educational and athletic programs.
In some instances, universities have agreed to eliminate price competition among themselves for highly sought-after, elite students and athletes.
For example, the 1,152 member institutions of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)1 have agreed not to provide athletically-related
financial aid in excess of the authorized cost of education at the student's
chosen institution. Even further in this direction, member institutions of the
so-called Ivy Overlap Group, which included twenty-two northeastern uni* Professor, South Texas College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the insightful critique of an earlier draft of this article by his colleague, Bruce W. Burton, the research
assistance of Lisa M. Tilton-McCarthy, and the secretarial assistance of Helen Flores.
1. NCAA Membership Hits All-Time High of 1,152, NCAA NEws, Aug. 31, 1994, at 16.
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versities and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), agreed not
to award merit-based aid and to collectively determine the amount of needbased financial assistance to be awarded to commonly admitted individual
students. 2
An elite athlete may singlehandedly enable a university to generate
increased revenues by playing a sport for the school. For example, while
Bo Jackson played football at Auburn University, season ticket sales substantially increased each year, thereby enabling the university to increase
revenues.' Auburn officials believe that at least some of the increase in
season ticket sales was directly attributable to Jackson's participation.4 It is
estimated that Patrick Ewing accounted for approximately twelve million
dollars in increased revenues while playing basketball for Georgetown
University.'
In addition to direct revenue benefits, universities may derive indirect
financial benefits from the efforts of their intercollegiate athletes. The
quantity and quality of students who apply to schools with successful athletic programs may increase. 6 Alumni and booster contributions to the university may expand. A university's reputation and prestige may also be
enhanced by favorable publicity and television appearances generated by a
winning athletic team.
Universities also derive substantial economic benefits from the enrollment of talented students. Attracting the best and brightest students will
enhance the quality of a university's student body, thereby enhancing the
school's prestige and enabling it to attract other desirable students and
faculty.7 This will have a cyclical effect, providing a university with an
enhanced opportunity to attract research grants and public and private contributions and funding. Talented students who become successful graduates
are likely to contribute money to their alma mater and will further enhance
their university's prestige by achieving significant stature in public or private employment.' Truly exceptional alumni may provide extraordinary
economic benefits to their schools in the form of extensive publicity by
winning significant awards such as a Nobel Prize or generating millions of
dollars in financial support because of their association with the university. 9
2.
3.

See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
ARTHUR A. FLEISHER, III ET AL., THE NATIONAL

COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION-

A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 45-46 n.4 (1992).

4.

Id.

5.

Id. at 92-93.

6. Id. at 101.
7. Donald R. Carlson & George B. Shepherd, Cartel on Campus: The Economics and Law
of Academic Institutions' FinancialAid Price-Fixing,71 OR. L. REV. 563, 571 (1992).

8. Id.
9.

Id. at 572.
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The thesis of this Article is that universities, although legally nonprofit in nature, are nevertheless de facto engaged in commercial activity
when recruiting students or athletes. Universities derive substantial short
and long-term economic benefits from the academic and athletic endeavors
of their best students. Each university has a strong economic incentive to
offer significant financial inducements to desired students for enrollment in
its undergraduate program or participation in its intercollegiate athletic program. Ordinary market forces, rather than collusion among economically
self-interested universities, should determine the optimal allocation of academically or athletically talented students among universities and the financial incentives offered for their enrollment and athletic participation.
This Article argues: that (1) NCAA restrictions on compensation to
athletes, (2) collective elimination of merit scholarships, and (3) joint determination of need-based financial aid are price fixing mechanisms that impede the free market. In effect, students with superlative academic
credentials or athletic skills are rewarded equally, although their individual
talents and abilities, and current or future economic value to a university,
differ. Thus, the antitrust laws should be applied to these joint arrangements in the same manner as agreements among competitors engaged in
commercial activity and must, therefore, be supported by a pro-competitive
economic justification to survive antitrust scrutiny. Courts have incorrectly
applied the antitrust laws in a manner that permits social welfare concerns
such as amateurism and socio-economic diversity to be accepted as legitimate justifications for price fixing by universities. 1" Non-economic social
welfare concerns do not justify agreements by universities to eliminate
price competition for students and athletes under the appropriate antitrust
analysis. If furtherance of these objectives justifies anti-competitive conduct, universities should collectively petition Congress for an exemption
from the antitrust laws.
My primary concern is the process by which the relative importance of
anti-competitive effects and noneconomic social welfare concerns are prioritized rather than the ultimate result of any balancing of such factors. In
my view, the operation of independent free market forces or Congressional
action, not collusion among universities, should determine the appropriate
level of price competition for elite students or athletes and allocation of
their talents among universities.
II.

NCAA

RESTRICTIONS ON ATHLETE COMPENSATION

The NCAA's constitution and by-laws expressly prohibit member
10. See infra notes 22-35, 66-68 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 61 1995

SoUTH TExAs LA

w REvIEw

[Vol. 36:59

schools from awarding financial aid to a student-athlete that exceeds the
cost of attendance normally incurred by students enrolled in a comparable
program at the subject school." An athlete generally may receive a maximum financial aid package that includes the value of tuition and fees, room
and board, and books to attend his or her chosen school.' 2 If an institution
provides financial aid other than that permitted by NCAA regulations, the
school is subject to disciplinary sanctions,' 3 and the athlete is not eligible to
participate in intercollegiate athletics.' 4 Representing the product of an
agreement among its more than 1,150 members, NCAA restrictions on athlete compensation clearly satisfy the concerted action requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 5
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 6 the
Supreme Court observed that college sports are "an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available
at all."' 7 The Court viewed college and professional sports as distinct products, and stated, in dicta, that college athletes must not be paid to preserve
the unique character and quality of college sports."8 The Court suggested
that NCAA rules maintaining the amateur status of college athletes are procompetitive because they widen the range of spectator sports available for
viewing by consumers.' 9 The Court also recognized that preserving competitive balance among amateur teams2" and the student-athlete's place in
higher education 2 ' are legitimate objectives of NCAA rules for antitrust
purposes.
To date, no court has held that the NCAA's maximum limits on the
11. NCAA MANUAL, art. 2, § 2.12 (const.) (1994-95) (permitting financial aid to student
athletes as long as "the amount does not exceed the cost of education"); id. art. 15, bylaw 15.01.7

(prohibiting a financial aid award "that exceeds the cost of attendance that normally is incurred by
students enrolled in a comparable program at that institution").
12. Id. art. 15, bylaw 15.2. "An NCAA institution in Division III [intercollegiate sports
competition] shall not award financial aid to any student-athlete except upon a showing of financial need by the recipient." Id. art. 15, bylaw 15.4.1.

13.

Id. art. 19, bylaw 19.01; see also id. art. 19, bylaw 19.6 (listing possible penalties for

violation of NCAA rules).
14. Id. art. 12, bylaw 12.1.2 (providing that an individual loses amateur status through receipt of "educational expenses not permitted by the governing legislation of the NCAA"); id. art.
15, bylaw 15.01.2 (declaring ineligible "[a]ny student-athlete who receives financial aid other than
that permitted" by the NCAA).
15. Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1147 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[Clonceptually the adoption
and execution of the NCAA Bylaw can be seen as the agreement and concert of action of the

various members of the association.").
16.
17.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 101.

18.

Id. at 102.

19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 117.

21.

Id. at 120.
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compensation an athlete may receive for playing an intercollegiate sport on
22
behalf of a university violates the antitrust laws. In McCormack v. NCAA,
a Southern Methodist University (SMU) alumnus claimed that the NCAA's
suspension of SMU's football program for exceeding restrictions on compensation for student-athletes violated the antitrust laws.2 3 The Fifth Circuit held that the NCAA's compensation rules did not unreasonably restrain
trade.24 The court reasoned that these regulations are a legitimate means of
fostering amateur athletic competition that have the pro-competitive effect
of enhancing public interest in intercollegiate athletics.25
Courts have also upheld NCAA rules rendering an athlete ineligible to
participate in a sport if he previously had been paid for playing the sport. In
Jones v. NCAA, 26 the court held that a student was ineligible to play intercollegiate ice hockey because he was paid money to play hockey before he
enrolled at Northeastern University. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim
that NCAA regulations declaring him ineligible to play college hockey violated the antitrust laws. The challenged regulations were found to be a legitimate means of implementing the NCAA's basic principles of
27
amateurism.
In Justice v. NCAA, 28 four University of Arizona football players asserted that the university's two-year exclusion from post-season bowl
games and television appearances for providing extra compensation to players violated the antitrust laws. The court held that the NCAA's enforcement of rules to preserve amateurism and enhance fair competition for
players by its members was permissible under the antitrust laws. The court
found that restrictions on student-athlete competition are not " 'an agreement with business competitors in the traditional sense' " and that the
NCAA sanctions reflect no anti-competitive purpose and are reasonably related to the NCAA's legitimate objectives.29
Consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that the NCAA
should be given "ample latitude"3 ° in maintaining amateurism in college
sports, several lower courts have upheld NCAA amateur eligibility rules. In
22. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
23. Id. at 1340. Specifically, McCormack argued that the restrictions on compensation to
football players amounted to illegal price fixing and that SMU's suspension constituted a group

boycott by other NCAA members. Id.
24. Id. at 1343.
25. Id. at 1344.
26.

392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).

27.
28.
29.

Id. at 304.
577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
Id. at 379 (citing Gunter Harz Sports v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103,

1116 (D. Neb. 1981)).

30.

NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
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Banks v. NCAA, 31 the Seventh Circuit held that the NCAA's "no draft" and
"no agent" rules withstood antitrust challenge. These regulations provided
that athletes lose their amateur status if they declare their eligibility for a
professional league player draft or agree to allow an agent to represent
them.32 Violation of these rules caused Braxton Banks to lose his final year
of college football eligibility and his athletic scholarship.3 3 He unsuccessfully sought to resume playing football for Notre Dame University after
failing to be selected in the National Football League (NFL) draft.
The Banks court found that the challenged rules did not restrain trade
in the college football labor market because "[t]he NCAA does not exist as
a minor league training ground for future NFL players but rather to provide
an opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a collegiate education. 34 The court reasoned that these rules helped to "preserve the bright line of demarcation between college and 'play for pay'
35
football.
These courts appear to focus almost exclusively on the public demandgenerated commercial success of intercollegiate sports that has resulted in
the creation of a billion dollar industry. Although both generate enormous
revenues for their sponsors, intercollegiate sports are considered sufficiently
distinct from professional sports to be treated differently for antitrust purposes. Courts view restraints on price competition for inputs such as players to be acceptable for intercollegiate sports,36 but not professional
sports, 3 7 even absent a pro-competitive economic justification.
III.

JOINT RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT TUITION DISCOUNTS

Since the 1950s, a group of twenty-three elite and mid-level colleges
and universities meet regularly to establish common policies on student financial aid and to fix financial aid levels. 38 They agreed to provide only
31. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
32. Id. at 1083-84 (referring to NCAA Bylaws 12.2.4.2 and 12.3.1).
33. Id. NCAA regulations currently permit college athletes to request information about
their market value in a professional sport without losing their amateur status. NCAA MANUAL,
art. 12, bylaw 12.2.4.1 (1994-95). Subject to compliance with certain conditions, a college basketball player may enter a professional league's draft once without losing his amateur status. Id.
art. 12, bylaw 12.2.4.2.1.
34. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089-90.
35. Id. at 1090; see also Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding
that the "no draft" and "no agent" rules do not violate antitrust laws).
36. See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,747 (D.D.C. Mar.
10, 1992).
38. The participants included the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the following Ivy League schools: Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University,
Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, and
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65

need-based financial aid to undergraduate students and to jointly determine
a single amount that all of the institutions would offer commonly admitted
students. 39 The effect of this agreement was to eliminate price competition
among Ivy Overlap Group schools for undergraduate students.
On May 22, 1991, after a two-year Justice Department investigation of
the financial aid programs of various colleges and universities, the United
States filed an antitrust suit against MIT and eight Ivy League schools.4 0
Concurrently with the filing of the complaint, the United States and eight
Ivy League schools filed a Consent Decree, which was entered and approved by the court on September 20, 1991. 1 MIT refused to agree to the
terms of the Consent Decree and elected to defend itself against the government's allegation that collectively determining the amount of financial aid
awarded to admitted students violates the antitrust laws.
The Consent Decree prohibited the consenting defendants from agreeing whether or not to offer merit-based aid as a general policy or to particular students, and agreeing on the amount of financial aid to be awarded to
any student.42 Each defendant was permitted to independently choose to
adopt a financial aid program based wholly or partially on the economic
needs of admitted students.4 3 The Consent Decree, however, expressly permitted defendants to continue their jointly determined policy of granting
financial aid to intercollegiate athletes "on the sole basis of economic
need," which is consistent with NCAA regulations." The Consent Decree
will expire ten years after its date of entry.4 5
On July 23, 1992, Congress passed legislation expressly permitting institutions of higher education to agree to award financial aid to students
Yale University, as well as Amherst College, Barnard College, Bowdoin College, Bryn Mawr
College, Colby College, Middlebury College, Mount Holyoke College, Smith College, Trinity
College, Tufts University, Vassar College, Wellesley College, Wesleyan University, and Williams
College. Theodore J. Stachtiaris, Note, Antitrust in Need: UndergraduateFinancialAid and
United States v. Brown University, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1745, 1746 nn.6 & 13 (1994).
39. Carlson & Shepherd, supra note 7, at 563.
40. Verified Complaint, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91-CV 3274 (E.D. Pa., May 22,
1991).
41. United States v. Brown Univ., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,391 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20,
1991) [hereinafter Brown Univ. I]. Although the other fourteen Overlap members were not
named as defendants in the government's suit, they agreed to comply with the terms of the Consent Decree. Carlson & Shepherd, supra note 7, at 564-65. The government's lawsuit gave rise
to the filing of a private antitrust suit by a student against members of the Overlap Group. See
Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 763 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. N.Y. 1991).
42. Brown Univ. 1, 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 71,039.
43. Id. at 171,041.
44. Id.; see also NCAA MANUAL, art. 20, bylaw 20.11.2 (1994-95) (prohibiting Division III
institutions, which would include members of the Ivy Overlap Group, from offering athletic scholarships "except upon a showing of financial need by the recipient").
45. Brown Univ. 1, 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 71,041.
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only on the basis of demonstrated financial need.46 The statute prohibits
schools from agreeing on the financial aid award for any commonly admit4
ted student. The legislation expired on September 30, 1994. 1
In United States v. Brown University 11,48 a federal district court held
that an agreement to eliminate merit scholarships and to establish a uniform
expected family contribution for educational expenses violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act.49 Although it rejected MIT's claim that universities' allocation of financial aid .is
exempt from antitrust scrutiny, and characterized
the challenged conduct as "price fixing," the court held that this agreement
is not per se illegal."
The court found that the agreement between Ivy Overlap Group members, which are horizontal competitors, had both the purpose and effect of
eliminating price competition for students. The court found that the "Ivy
Overlap agreements are plainly anticompetitive" by effectively depriving
students of the opportunity to consider competing offers of financial assistance in selecting a college education. 1
The court stated that the Rule of Reason 52 placed upon MIT" 'a heavy
burden of establishing an affirmative defense which competitively justifies
this apparent deviation from the operations of a free market.' "" MIT asserted that the objective of Ivy Overlap Group was "to enroll the most qualified student body possible" and that coordinated financial aid distribution
by member schools is necessary to accomplish this objective. 5 4 MIT expressed concern that "a bidding war for the 'best of the brightest' " would
reduce available money for need-based financial aid and reduce educational
opportunities for relatively poor students.5 5
The court held that MIT's non-economic social welfare defenses did
not justify the elimination of university price competition for students.56
46.

Need-Based Aid Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 1544, 106 Stat. 609 (1992).

47. Id.
48. 805 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1992) [hereinafter Brown Univ. I1].
49. Id. at 301-07. Section one of the Sherman Act, as judicially construed, prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. See Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Literally, § 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "[elvery contract,

combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states .... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
50. Brown Univ. HI, 805 F. Supp. at 301 n.7.
51. Id. at 304.
52. For a general discussion of the application of the Rule of Reason, see United States v.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Brown Univ. III].
53. Brown Univ. 11, 805 F. Supp. at 304 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 304-05.
56. Id. at 305.
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The court found no plausible pro-competitive economic defenses to justify
the Ivy Overlap. Applying a truncated rule of reason, the court found that
the Ivy Overlap Group agreements unreasonably restrained trade without
the need to balance their anti-competitive effects with MIT's improper
justifications.5 7
There was no evidence that invalidation of Ivy Overlap on antitrust
grounds would cause the elimination of need-blind admissions or needbased financial aid. The court observed that "[e]very institution, with or
without Overlap, is free to embrace independently any admission and financial aid policy it wishes, and most do."5
The district court entered a broad permanent injunction prohibiting
MIT from participating in any agreement having "the effect, or tendency to
affect, the determination of the price, or any adjustment thereof," of a university education for any student.59 The injunction prohibited MIT from
agreeing with other universities to establish a uniform expected family contribution for educational expenses and not award merit scholarships.
On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed that providing financial assistance
to students is part of the process of setting tuition and constitutes a commercial transaction subject to the coverage of the antitrust laws. 6' The court,
however, reversed the district court's determination that the Ivy Overlap
Group agreement violated the Sherman Act. The court found that agreeing
to award only need-based financial aid and collectively determining the
amount of financial aid for commonly admitted students was "price fixing
in 'a literal sense.' "61 This conduct was not considered per se illegal because it was engaged in by bona fide nonprofit institutions with a public
62
interest motive.
The Third Circuit agreed with the lower court's finding that the Ivy
Overlap Group's purpose was "to eliminate price competition for talented
students among member institutions" and that its effect was "to -restrain
'competitive bidding' and deprive prospective students of 'the ability to
utilize and compare prices' in selecting among schools. '63 The court observed that the " 'hallmark' consequences of price fixing," such as a higher
price for an MIT education or lower student enrollment, was missing in this
57.
cated or
58.
59.

Id.; see also Brown Univ. II1, 5 F.3d at 669 (providing a general discussion of the trun"quick look" rule of reason).
Brown Univ. 11, 805 F. Supp. at 305.
Brown Univ. 111,
5 F.3d at 665.

60.

Id. at 665-68.

61.

Id. at 670.

62.
63.

Id. at 672.
Id. at 673.
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case. 64 Nevertheless, the court required MIT to prove that the challenged
price fixing is justified by "some procompetitive virtue, or with a showing
of Overlap's reasonable necessity to its institutional purpose. 65
The court held that enhancing the quality and accessibility of education at Ivy Overlap schools by ensuring that financial aid is available to
needy students is a legitimate pro-competitive economic justification enhancing consumer choice. 66 The court rejected MIT's claim that eliminating price competition is a legitimate means of facilitating non-price
competition for students. 67 Noting that Overlap's objectives are consistent
with federal loan programs that distribute financial aid solely on the basis of
need, the court held that promoting "equality of educational access and opportunity" was a legitimate social welfare justification to be considered
under the rule of reason.68
Disagreeing with the lower court, the Third Circuit held that "a full
rule of reason analysis" is necessary to determine the legality of Overlap.69
The court suggested that if MIT proves that the Ivy Overlap Group agreement furthers the above "legitimate objectives," then the government must
prove that these objectives could be satisfied through a substantially less
restrictive alternative.7" For example, the "free market coupled with MIT's
institutional resolve"7 1 or "other imaginable creative alternatives"7 " might
be shown to further the policies of need-blind admissions and full needbased aid to promote the goals of achieving a diverse student body and
increasing access to opportunities for an elite undergraduate education.
Before the case was considered on remand by the district court, MIT
and the government entered into a settlement agreement resulting in its dismissal. Under the settlement agreement, MIT is allowed to agree with other
universities to award financial aid solely on the basis of need and to exchange limited information about applicants' financial profiles.73 However,
MIT may not agree with other schools to establish a uniform expected family contribution for commonly admitted students.74 The government agreed
64. Id. at 674.
65. Id.
66.

Id. at 674-75.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 675.
Id.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 678-79.

71.

Id. at 679.

72. Id. at 677.
73. Stachtiaris, supra note 38, at 1745 n.2; Srikanth Srinivasan, Note, College FinancialAid
and Antitrust: Applying the Sherman Act to CollaborativeNonprofit Activity, 46 STAN. L. REV.
919, 925 n.51 (1994); MIT Resolves Division Concerns About "Overlap" in FinancialAid, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 66, at 11 (Jan. 13, 1994) [hereinafter MIT Resolves].
74. MIT Resolves, supra note 73, at 11-12.
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to modify the 1991 Consent decree with the eight Ivy League schools to
provide consistency with the MIT settlement agreement." It appears that
this settlement agreement is also consistent with the expired 1992 federal
legislation. 76
IV.

COMMERCIAL NATURE OF UNIVERSITY RECRUITING OF STUDENTS

AND ATHLETES

The federal antitrust laws apply only to concerted activities that restrain trade or commerce. 77 In a 1970 case, Marjorie Webster Junior Col-

lege Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools,
Inc.,"7 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a nonprofit educational corporation's accrediting activities are not subject to antitrust scrutiny.7 9 The court observed that the Sherman Act " 'is aimed
primarily at combinations having commercial objectives' "8o and found that
"the process of accreditation is an activity distinct from the sphere of commerce."81 This decision suggested that purely "educational matters" not
having a "commercial motive" are exempt from the antitrust laws.8 2
Both the NCAA's 8 3 and the Ivy Overlap Group's 84 current restraints
on price competition for students and athletes and enforcement mechanisms
were established in the 1950s. Prior to 1975, when the Supreme Court held
that the learned professions are not exempt from the antitrust laws, 85 institutions of higher education had little fear of antitrust liability for engaging in
collective activities having anti-competitive effects.
In 1984, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act applies to commercial activity by institutions of higher education despite their non-profit
status. In NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,86 the
Court ruled that universities' collective sale of television rights to college
football games were covered by the antitrust laws.8 7 The Court noted that
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
(1959)).
81.

Id.at 12.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Id. at 654-55.
Id. at 654 (quoting Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7
Id.at 655.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 654-55.

86.

468 U.S. 85 (1984). See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA &

supra note 3, at 49-50.
United States v. Brown Univ. III, 5 F.3d 658, 662-63 (3d Cir. 1993).
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-88 (1975).
FLEISHER,

HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

AIrI-

TRUST LAW 232.2 (Supp. 1993) (stating that non-profit status by itself confers no blanket exemption from antitrust laws).
87. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 98-99.
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"the NCAA and its member institutions are in fact organized to maximize
revenues" 88 and compete with each other for television revenues, fans, and
athletes. 89 Thus, university income-generating activity is subject to antitrust scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether collective restraints on price competition for elite students and athletes involve "trade or
commerce" covered by the antitrust laws. In resolving this issue, lower
courts appear to focus on whether joint limits on academic or athletic financial aid are a covered means of reducing economic competition for students
and athletes, or are an exempt non-commercial aspect of higher education.
In United States v. Brown University 111,90 the Third Circuit held that a
university's provision of financial assistance is an effective means of discounting tuition for desired students. Offering financial assistance in the
form of loans, grants, or work study reduces a student's net education cost
and provides an economic incentive to attend the university. 91 The court
correctly found the offering of financial assistance to be "a commercial
transaction" rather than the non-commercial distribution of university charitable funds.9 2
Courts have correctly determined that the NCAA's efforts to regulate
competition for inputs necessary to produce intercollegiate athletics, such as
limiting the size of coaching staffs, are not immune from the antitrust
laws.9 3 These courts appropriately recognize the inherent commercial nature of recruiting personnel involved in producing intercollegiate athletics.
Like other businesses that provide a product for public consumption, universities must attract the human resources necessary to operate. This inevitably involves competing for desired resources with those offering a similar
product.
On the other hand, some lower courts have suggested that the collective establishment of eligibility standards to preserve the amateur status of
college athletes should be exempt from antitrust scrutiny.94 These courts
88. Id. at 101 n.22. Accord College FootballAssociation, [1993-94 Transfer Binder] FTC
Complaints and Orders (CCH) 23,631 at 23,358 (July 8, 1994) (finding that an organization of

66 major football playing universities "engages in large-scale, commercial activity from which it
generates substantial revenue.").
89. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 99.
90. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
91. Id. at 666-68.

92. Id. at 668.
93. See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1151 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that restricting the number of coaching positions impacts interstate commerce by reducing the movement
of coaches between institutions located in different states); Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v.
NCAA, 561 P.2d 499, 505 n.14 (Okla. 1977) (noting that the provision of coaching services to
amateur athletics is commercial in nature).
94. See, e.g., Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (exempting eligi-

HeinOnline -- 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 70 1995

1995]

ILLEGAL UNIVERSITY PRICE FIXING

view intercollegiate athletics and the recruiting of athletes as part of the
process of higher education, implicitly adopting "the Principle of Amateurism" set forth in the NCAA's constitution, which states that:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by
the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises. 9'
In Gaines v. NCAA, 96 a federal district court held that the NCAA's "no
draft" and "no agent" rules are not subject to antitrust analysis. The court
accepted the NCAA's argument that these rules "are not designed to generate profits in a commercial activity but to preserve amateurism by assuring
that the recruitment of student athletes does not become a commercial
activity."9 7
Similarly, in Jones v. NCAA, 98 the court held that NCAA rules rendering an athlete ineligible if he has received "pay" to play a particular sport
are "particularly inappropriate for application of the Sherman Act." 99 The
court found that these eligibility guidelines do not have "any nexus to commercial or business activities. ' ' t°"
In its recruiting efforts, a university acts as a "seller" of educational
services to students; whereas, a university functions as a "buyer" of the
services of athletes. In both instances, a university competes with certain
other schools for talented students and athletes.' As evidenced by "underthe-table" payments to athletes by university representatives" °2 and bidding
bility standards from antitrust scrutiny because their overriding purpose is to "preserve the unique
atmosphere of competition between 'student-athletes,' "not to provide a competitive advantage to
the NCAA); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (holding that the Sherman
Act does not reach actions of NCAA members in setting eligibility requirements); College Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. NCAA, 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,117, 65,266-67 (D.N.J. Aug.
22, 1974) (holding that an NCAA rule designed- to promote amateurism in college sports as it
relates to education "does not come within the purview of the Sherman Act").
95. NCAA MANUAL, art. 2, § 2.8 (const.) (1994-95).
96. 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
97. Id. at 743.
98. 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
99. Id. at 303.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Brown Univ. III, 5 F.3d 658, 667 (3d Cir. 1993) (admitting that MIT
competes with Ivy League schools for outstanding students); Lee Goldman, Sports andAntitrust:
Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 210 (1990) (discussing
competition among NCAA member schools for athletes).
102. MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS. THE UNIVERSITY 246-55 (1990) (discussing how athletic departments recruit athletes outside of the NCAA
rules).
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for sought-after students by discounting tuition,10 3 universities have a
strong independent economic motive to engage in price competition for desired students and athletes.
In deciding whether to provide financial incentives to a desired student
or athlete, a rational university calculates whether the anticipated benefit to
the school from the student's attendance or participation in sports exceeds

the cost of the academic financial aid or an athletic scholarship. A university may reap substantial short- and long-term economic benefits from the
enrollment of an elite student or athlete." 4 Top athletes may significantly
enhance a university's athletic revenues and increase applications by prospective students desiring to attend a school with winning athletic teams.
Talented students will enhance a university's quality, prestige, and ability to
attract other desired students and faculty. Successful recruitment of elite
students and athletes is a vital part of a university's efforts to enhance its
reputation and attract needed financial resources.
University efforts to eliminate price competition for elite students or
athletes are appropriately characterized as a commercial means of minimizing costs for collectively desired human resources. 10 5 Jointly determined
maximum limits on the financial incentives universities may offer to students or athletes should be subject to antitrust scrutiny.' ° 6 These restraints
deprive talented students and athletes of the opportunity to receive offers of
103.

William Celis, Colleges Caught in Middle as ParentsSeek Best Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July

6, 1994, at Al.
104.

See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.

105. MIT acknowledged that the "purpose of Overlap is to eliminate price competition for
talented students among member institutions." United States v. Brown Univ. III, 5 F.3d 658, 673
(3d Cir. 1993). Richard Schulz, former executive director of the NCAA, admitted that "financial
concerns are the primary reason for rejecting proposals to pay college-athletes a stipend."
Goldman, supra note 101, at 217; see also James V. Koch, The Economic Realities of Amateur
Sports Organizations,61 IND. L.J. 9, 11 (1985) (describing NCAA regulations designed to restrict
competition among universities for student-athletes).
106. For discussions by law review commentators who generally argue that NCAA restrictions on payments to student-athletes are not exempt from the antitrust laws, see Steve Murphy &
Jonathan Pace, A Planfor Compensating Student-Athletes, B.Y.U. EDUc. AND L.J. 167, 169-70

(1994); Note, Sherman Act Invalidationof the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299,
1305-07, 1314 n.84 (1992); Goldman, supra note 101, at 215-19.
Legal scholars have disagreed whether university agreements on the type and amount of
financial aid to be offered to students should be immunized from antitrust scrutiny. Some authors
argue that such agreements should be immune from antitrust, see Mark D. Selwyn, Higher Education Under Fire: The New Threat of Antitrust, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 117 (1992); Ste-

phen D. Browning, Note, The Misguided Application of the Sherman Act to Colleges and
Universities in the Context of Sharing FinancialAid Information, 33 B.C. L. REV. 763 (1992);

Srinivasan, supra note 73, at 947-49; Stachtiaris, supra note 38, at 1753-62. On the other hand,
other authors believe that such agreements should not be immune from antitrust scrutiny, see
Carlson & Shepherd, supra note 7, at 563; Richard Morrison, Price Fixing Among Elite Colleges
and Universities, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 807 (1992); Douglas R. Richmond, Private Colleges and
Tuition Price-Fixing: An Antitrust Primer, 17 J.C. & U.L. 271 (1991).
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greater financial benefits from universities which have an independent economic incentive to do so absent an agreement with their competitors.
V.

APPROPRIATE ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

Both the NCAA and Ivy Overlap Group have the indicia of a price
fixing cartel. The classic elements of such a cartel are competitors who
collectively possess market power, an agreement to prevent free market
forces from determining prices, and a mechanism for enforcing and policing
the agreement. The membership of these associations consists of universities that would actively engage in price competition for elite students and
athletes absent an agreement to the contrary. The Supreme Court has recognized that the NCAA is an association of schools (now more than 1,150)
which compete against each other for athletes and possess market power
over those athletes. 10 7 Similarly, the district court in Brown University 11
found the Ivy Overlap Group members to be horizontal competitors which
compete among themselves for students.' 8 Commentators have suggested
that the Ivy Overlap's member schools possess market power because their
highly regarded reputations create a separate market for their educational
services.09
The respective agreements among members of the NCAA and the Ivy
Overlap Group are commercial in nature, economically self-interested, and
enforced with sanctions. A member school that violates NCAA rules
against paying athletes is subject to economic sanctions, such as a prohibition against television or bowl game appearances or temporary suspension
of play in a sport-either of which may result in the loss of substantial
revenues to a school's athletic program." 0 In Brown University II, the district court found that a school's failure to comply with the Ivy Overlap
agreement could result in severe sanctions, making incidents of cheating
107. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99, 111 (1984). "Market
power is the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market."
Id. at 109 n.38.
108. 805 F. Supp. 288, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
109. Carlson & Shepherd, supra note 7, at 563-65; Morrison, supra note 106, at 811; Richmond, supra note 106, at 271. See generally DAVID A. GARVIN, THE ECONOMICS OF UNIVERSITY
BEHAVIOR 7-16 (1980) (discussing the segmentation of the higher education market and noting
the existence of a separate submarket for prestigious high quality institutions).
110. See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that
the school's alumni, cheerleaders, and football players wrongly brought suit on behalf of the
school after the school's football program had been suspended by the NCAA); Justice v. NCAA,

577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1985) (stating that the university's football program was prohibited
from participating in post-season competition and from appearing on television according to an
NCAA ruling). The NCAA is appropriately characterized as a "monopsonist" because its members have the collective ability to depress the offered price for college athletes' services as they

jointly constitute a substantial segment of the demand for their services.
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University recruiting of elite students and athletes is a commercial activity motivated by economic concerns. Therefore, traditional antitrust
analysis should be applied to restraints on price competition among schools
desiring the talents of those students and athletes. The ultimate issue in the
analysis becomes: What is "the competitive significance of. the restraint"? 112 The Supreme Court has held that "[tihe true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition."'1 3
Collective restraints on price competition for mutually desired students
and athletes have similar anti-competitive effects. First, exceptionally talented students and athletes are deprived of the opportunity to choose a
school based on price considerations. The value of a particular student or
athlete to a school may exceed the jointly established maximum financial
aid or scholarship value. Limiting the amount of financial assistance that
can be awarded prevents the free market from establishing the market value
for a student's academic prowess or an athlete's physical skills and abilities.
Second, preventing price competition for sought-after athletes and students unfairly redistributes wealth from students to colleges and universities. Continuing to enroll a high quality student body is necessary to attract
alumni contributions, thereby expanding university endowments. Outstanding students or athletes may generate more revenue for their respective
schools than the cost to educate them or the cost to have them participate on
their athletic teams. A superstar athlete, like Bo Jackson or Patrick Ewing,
or the collective efforts of lesser talented athletes, may generate athletic
revenues for a university that greatly exceed the individual or aggregate
cost of their athletic scholarships.
Third, restraints on price competition are likely to cause inefficient
non-price competition for students and athletes. Universities attempt to differentiate themselves by offering their students higher quality facilities and
services, such as better professors, well manicured grounds, more ornate
dormitories and classrooms, elaborate recreational opportunities, and extensive medical and counseling services."14 Athletic departments entice athletes with highly regarded and well known coaches, modem stadiums and
training facilities, promises of playing time, and media exposure to enhance
the opportunities of a future professional career, as well as special dormito111.
112.

United States v. Brown Univ. II, 805 F. Supp. 288, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (quoting Na-

tional Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
113. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 23.1, 238 (1918).
114. Carlson & Shepherd, supra note 7, at 587-89.
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ries, fancy food, and other amenities.' 5 Students may prefer lower tuition
prices, and athletes may desire higher compensation for playing, although
unrestrained price competition may result in the provision of a lower level
of amenities. Universities are able to subsidize unnecessary or undesired
facilities and services with the cost savings from restrictions on price
competition.
Fourth, a collective unwillingness to engage in price competition
causes allocative inefficiency in matching students and athletes with universities, thereby preventing maximum benefits to both parties. A prohibition
on price competition may prevent a university from offering greater financial aid and from luring a student away from a slightly higher ranked university whose attendance would enhance the former university's prestige.
Similarly, Northwestern University may be unable to attract a top athlete
away from Notre Dame unless it is able to offer a financial package that
exceeds the value of an athletic scholarship. Ordinary free market forces
that combine both price and non-price competition should result in the optimal allocation of human resources among universities in the recruiting of
elite students and athletes." 6 Under free market conditions, a university
would be willing to provide financial assistance up to the amount that the
student or athlete will benefit the institution, and the student or athlete will
choose the university that is perceived to offer the maximum net benefits.
To justify the anti-competitive effects of price fixing in connection
with the recruiting of elite students and athletes, this restraint must promote
a pro-competitive economic justification that cannot be achieved by a substantially less restrictive alternative." 7 In other words, price fixing by universities for desired human resources is legal only if it has a net procompetitive effect that cannot be accomplished by other viable means. The
remainder of this Article will discuss the primary justifications asserted by
universities for agreeing not to engage in price competition for elite students and athletes.
VI.

PRESERVING COMPETITIVE BALANCE

The Supreme Court has held that jointly establishing a uniform price
for a product or service that cannot be produced without collaboration
115. SPERBER, supra note 102, at 229-31.
116. See Carlson & Shepherd, supra note 7, at 607, 605-08 (arguing that "student and institutional quality should match as well in a system with perfect price competition as in a system with
no price competition").
117. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113-20 (1984). Accord
National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (rejecting claimed noneconomic justification for price fixing and noting existence of substantially less restrictive means
for preventing deceptively low bids).
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among competitors is legal absent a substantially less restrictive means of
ensuring product or service availability."' Although maintaining the competitive balance among amateur athletic teams that regularly play games
together is a legitimate objective necessitating some agreement on recruiting practices," 9 an NCAA-imposed and enforced national ban on all price
competition for athletes is overbroad. Courts generally assume that all
1,152 NCAA member schools must agree on a uniform maximum "compensation" level for all athletes to preserve the integrity of intercollegiate
sports and ensure balanced competition.12 ° This apparent underlying assumption is incorrect. Not all NCAA member schools compete against
each other in all sports. Rather, NCAA schools are grouped by division for
purposes of applicable bylaw legislation and competition in NCAA championships.' 2 ' For example, although Notre Dame regularly plays football
against Big Ten Conference schools such as Michigan and Purdue, it generally does not play Division III schools such as Harvard and Yale.
There would be viable regional and national intercollegiate athletic
competition absent NCAA-enforced nationwide restraints on price competition for athletes. Although some limits on price competition for athletes
appear necessary to ensure balanced competition among members of the
same league or conference, the NCAA's nationwide ban on price competition is overbroad and unnecessary.' 22 On the other hand, it may be permissible for a smaller group of geographically-dispersed schools, such as
Division III universities or the sixty-six members of the College. Football
Association, to agree on the maximum compensation for athletes if necessary to preserve the integrity of athletic competition among their members.
Invalidation of current NCAA restraints on price competition would
allow universities to align themselves consistent with the economic potential of their athletic programs. Economic factors are already driving conference expansion and realignments by major football and basketball powers.
A super conference of universities with big-time athletic programs may
agree to permit its members to pay athletes a stipend in addition to educational costs to attract desired athletes. Doing so would enable these schools
to acquire the best athletes, thereby enhancing the quality of their athletic
teams and stimulating consumer interest in their "on-the-field" product.
118. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
119. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
120. See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
121. NCAA MANUAL, art. 20 (1994-95).
122. It is arguable that the NCAA's ban on price competition actually inhibits competitive
balance by enabling universities with more prestigious athletic programs to continue attracting top
athletes and preventing schools with lesser athletic programs from fielding stronger teams by
offering greater financial incentives to the best athletes.
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Other schools may choose to limit athletic scholarships to the value of educational expenses or to not offer athletic scholarships at all, as currently
done by NCAA Division III universities.123 Thus, free market forces, considering the revenue-generating potential of individual athletic programs,
and the association or league need for competitive balance would most effectively match athletes and universities by ensuring a fuller consideration
of the potential economic benefits of a particular athlete's services and the
corresponding costs of acquiring those services.
VII.

PRESERVING AMATEURISM

Courts also view the NCAA's ban on "paying" athletes as a pro-competitive means of preserving the unique character of amateur sports, which
are considered distinct from professional sports. 2 4 The Supreme Court has
stated that "to preserve the character and quality of the 'product' [college
sports], athletes must not be paid." 2 ' The Court assumes that the primary
distinguishing feature between college and professional sports is that only
those athletes playing professionally are paid for their services. The nonpayment of amateurs maintains the perceived purity of intercollegiate athletics, thereby accounting for their enormous popularity.
In many ways, college sports, particularly high-caliber football and
basketball programs, are more similar to professional sports than amateur
sports at the high school and youth levels. Like professional athletes, scholarship athletes have a contractual relationship with their universities.26 In
both instances, athletes receive a quid pro quo for playing. Professional
athletes receive money and other benefits for playing; college athletes receive in-kind compensation comprised of tuition, room and board, and related educational expenses.
Elite college athletes often choose to attend a particular university due
to the caliber and quality of its team in a particular sport. The university's
academic reputation may only be a secondary consideration.' 2 7 Many elite
athletes attend college primarily to refine their athletic skills in anticipation
of a future professional career or opportunity to participate in the Olympics,
rather than to develop their academic potential. 2 8 For these athletes, participation in intercollegiate athletics is more than an "avocation" and is not
primarily motivated by the educational, physical, mental, and social bene123. NCAA MANUAL, art. 20, bylaw 20.11.2 (1994-95).
124. See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
125. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984).
126. See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. App. 1972) (holding that
an athletic scholarship is a contract between athlete and university).
127. SPERBER, supra note 102, at 8-9.
128. Id.
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fits espoused in the NCAA's creed of amateurism. 129
Intercollegiate sports, like professional sports, generate millions of
dollars for their sponsoring entities. Both college and professional sports
are shown extensively on television and have rabid followers. Over the last
forty years, college sports have grown from a small business into a major
industry grossing over one billion dollars in revenues per year. 30 Large
NCAA member universities generate millions of dollars annually from the
operation of their intercollegiate athletics programs.' 3 1 Even smaller
NCAA schools that do not participate in intercollegiate football generate
significant revenues from their sports programs.' 32 College athletics programs typically earn substantial revenues from ticket sales, guarantees for
playing away games, payouts from participating in bowl games and tournaments, television appearances, as well as from sales of licensed merchan133
dise bearing the university's name or logo and corporate sponsorships.
The success, popularity, and economic viability of college and professional
teams is largely dependent on the athletic abilities and skills of their
players.
It is unlikely that the tremendous popularity of intercollegiate sports is
a result of the amateur status of college athletes. Other factors seem to be
more significant in accounting for the strong national public interest in college sports. For example, alumni pride and loyalty, tradition, long-standing
rivalries, national rankings, conference and national championship tournament competition, and exciting play probably contribute to the public obsession with college sports more than the "amateur" status of college
athletes.
Allowing universities to engage. in price competition for college athletes will not destroy any judicially perceived "unique character" of inter13 4
collegiate sports that distinguishes them from professional sports.
Although college athletes historically have not received a monetary stipend
for playing a sport, allowing such a payment would not change the nature
and quality of intercollegiate athletics. Academic eligibility requirements
35
could continue to be used to preserve the athlete's status as a student.'
Requiring that athletes be full-time students, while limiting college athletic
129.
130.
131.

See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
FLEISHER, supra note 3, at 4.
DANIEL L. FULLIS, REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PRO-

GRAMS: FINANCIAL TRENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS-1993

8 (1994).

132. Id.
SPERBER, supra note 102, at 30-91.
134. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-02 (1984).
133.

135. See also Deborah E. Klein & William B. Briggs, Proposition 48 and the Business of
IntercollegiateAthletics: PotentialAntitrust Ramifications Under the Sherman Act, 67 DENv. U.
L. REV. 301 (1990) (discussing whether NCAA academic eligibility standards for student-athletes
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eligibility to four years and other jointly determined requirements regarding
team size, number of games, and practice seasons and times, should maintain the fundamental nature of college athletics and continue to distinguish
them from professional sports.
A complete restriction on price competition for college athletes imposed by a national organization of economic competitors with disciplinary
powers does not further a legitimate pro-competitive objective. Preserving
the noneconomic social welfare goal of amateurism in college sports should
not be accepted as a justification for horizontal price fixing. Continuing to
recognize such a justification will prevent athletes from sharing in the economic benefits that their services allow university athletic departments to
derive.
Some commentators assert that NCAA restrictions on price competition do not suppress the "compensation" that intercollegiate athletes receive
for playing their respective sports below amounts that would otherwise result if competitive bidding were permissible.13 6 Others argue that the direct, indirect, and intangible benefits of a college degree financed by an
athletic scholarship exceed the fair market value of an athlete's services
rendered to a university.1 37 These arguments, however, do not legitimately
justify price fixing. There is a strong national policy in favor of having the
free market determine prices, and the asserted reasonableness of a price
138
fixed by competitors is not an accepted justification.
It is possible that permitting universities to engage in price competition
for athletes will reduce available university-provided financial assistance to
lesser-talented athletes or those participating in non-revenue-producing
sports. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,131 which requires
proportional athletic opportunities and financial assistance for both sexes,
violate antitrust laws); see generally NCAA MANUAL, art. 14 (1994-95) (listing the academic

requirements for student-athletes under NCAA bylaws);
136. Richard B. McKenzie & E. Thomas Sullivan, Does the NCAA Exploit College Athletes?-An Economics and Legal Reinterpretation, ANTrrRUST BULL., Summer 1987, at 373.
137. Vincent J. Dooley, Compensation to Student-Athletes Already Exists Without Direct
Payments, A-MLON's FOOT'BALL 1994, at 53 (1994).

138. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
424 (1990) ("The social justifications proffered for respondents' restraint of trade thus do not
make it any less unlawful. The statutory policy underlying the Sherman Act 'precludes inquiry
into the question whether competition is good or bad.' .. . Respondents' argument, like that made
by the petitioners in ProfessionalEngineers, ultimately asks us to find that their boycott is permissible because the price it seeks to set is reasonable. But it was settled shortly after the Sherman
Act was passed that it 'is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves reasonable.' ") (citations
omitted); United States. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) ("[Ulniform price
fixing by those controlling in any substantial manner a trade or business in interstate commerce is
prohibited by the Sherman Law, despite the reasonableness of the particular prices agreed upon.").
139. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988).
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should adequately protect the interests of female intercollegiate athletes.' 40
Male athletes, however, may receive reduced financial assistance for playing an intercollegiate sport, particularly if it does not provide net revenues
to a university. While this would be an unfortunate consequence of price
competition, it would flow from the operation of free market forces. A
university may decide to subsidize an intercollegiate sport that loses money
and continue to offer financial incentives to participating athletes if the university's benefits exceed those costs. Alternatively, a university could allow students to continue deriving the educational benefits of participation in
certain sports by offering them as club or intramural sports.
VIII.

ENHANCING ACCESSIBILITY AND QUALITY 'OF HIGHER EDUCATION

In United States v. Brown University III,41 the Third Circuit held that
ensuring that financial aid is ,available to needy students is a pro-competitive economic justification for the Ivy Overlap Group's elimination of price
competition for talented students among member schools.' 42 The alleged
objective of this joint program was to increase access to higher education
for needy students and to enhance socio-economic diversity within university student bodies. 43
Contrary to the Third Circuit's holding, coordinating financial aid distribution policies to ensure the availability of money for need-based financial aid is not a pro-competitive economic justification. It does not increase
the total amount of financial aid available to all students or the total number
of students admitted to Ivy Overlap member institutions. It is unclear
whether the Ivy Overlap Group agreement allowed member schools to increase their aggregate net tuition revenues. Absent the Ivy Overlap Group
agreement, individual participating universities have an economic incentive
to award increased financial aid to certain desired students,'" reducing the
net tuition costs of these students, which would result in an apparent decline
in a university's aggregate net tuition revenues.
140.

Courts have applied Title IX to prevent universities from dropping women's intercollegi-

ate athletic teams as a cost-cutting measure if doing so causes disproportionate athletic participation opportunities among the sexes. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir.
1993) (stating that an educational institution can violate Title IX by failing to accommodate students' athletic interests and abilities, even if it meets federal regulatory requirements of financial
assistance and educational equivalents equality); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998
F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the university violated Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972 when it discontinued the women's varsity fast pitch softball team, and
issuing a permanent injunction reinstating program).
141. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 674-75.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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The Ivy Overlap Group agreement has the pro-competitive effect of
decreasing the net tuition cost of an elite university education for talented,
needy students. This goal, however, is accomplished by a forced cross subsidization of the educational costs of poor students by rich students.145 The
validity of such a redistribution of financial resources among students
merely implicates social welfare concerns that should not be accepted as a
justification for anti-competitive conduct. Moreover, price competition
among universities seeking to enhance the socio-economic diversity of their
respective student bodies may be the best means of maximizing available
financial aid for needy students. It seems anomalous that universities
would have a strong interest in student diversity without having a corresponding economic incentive to compete for students that will enable them
to achieve this objective.
Assuming that the socio-economic diversity contributed by talented
needy students enhances the overall quality of education provided to all
students, the total elimination of price competition resulting from the Ivy
Overlap Group's agreement remains unjustified.'6 The Supreme Court has
recognized that competition is the preferred means of ensuring that the
quality of available products and services is responsive to consumer demand. 14 7 To the extent that quality higher education is dependent upon a
diverse student body, there is a marketplace incentive for each member of
the Ivy Overlap Group to individually allocate its financial aid resources
accordingly.
IX.

PROBABLE

EFFEcTs

OF PRICE COMPETITION

Applying traditional antitrust analysis, it is unlikely that agreements by
the NCAA or the Ivy Overlap Group members to eliminate price competition for mutually desired talented students or athletes is legal under the
Sherman Act. These agreements have clear anti-competitive effects that are
not justified by pro-competitive economic objectives. Rather, price competition, driven by each member university's independent economic interests,
probably would allow institutions of higher education to achieve their legitimate objectives, but at a higher cost to universities.
University price competition for students and athletes would likely in145.

Morrison, supra note 106, at 812-13, 822-23.

146. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 422
(1990) (rejecting claimed quality enhancement defense because it is not a judicial "task to pass
upon the social utility or political wisdom of price-fixing agreements").
147. Id. at 423; see also National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978) (stating that the Sherman Act was designed to prevent "unreasonable restrains on competition," which would enable consumers to make price comparisons and other decisions related to the
goods available).
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crease the financial rewards, in the form of money or in-kind benefits, offered to exceptionally talented students and athletes. A school has a strong
economic incentive to attract the best students and athletes to its campus.
On the other hand, considerations of intra-institutional equality and morale
may discourage a university from providing widely varying amounts of financial incentives to its athletes and students.14 8 Developing a sense of
team work and unity is particularly important in the context of athletics.
Jealousy and ill-will among team members receiving differing financial incentives to play a sport may be divisive and counterproductive to the development of a successful team. These factors may significantly influence a
university's independent decision regarding the nature and character of any
price competition it is willing to engage in for students and athletes.
Price competition will enable students and athletes to weigh monetary
considerations along with non-price factors in selecting a university.
Sought-after students will have the opportunity to consider different financial incentives, as well as a university's academic quality and prestige,
along with the opportunities provided by having a degree from the institution. Top-flight athletes will evaluate the amount of offered compensation
for playing a sport, as well as the athletic and academic opportunities provided by a particular university. A highly desirable effect of price competition may be the elimination of inefficient non-price competition by
universities for coveted students and athletes. University financial resources would be more effectively utilized to meet the mutual needs and
interests of schools, students, and athletes.
Price competition may also have the adverse effects of reducing available financial aid for marginal students and scholarships for lesser talented
athletes. Paying athletes would further erode the out-dated concept of amateurism in intercollegiate athletics. In addition, talented rich students may
receive unneeded financial assistance to attend a university that equally talented poor students cannot afford to attend.
If the foregoing effects are deemed to be socially undesirable, or free
market price competition adversely affects academic or athletic programs,
Congressional corrective action may be necessary. Congress, representing
broad political and societal perspectives, may establish the bounds of university cooperation required to achieve social welfare objectives that are not
furthered by the operation of the free market. Under current law, universities may petition Congress jointly for a limited exemption from the antitrust
laws for any concerted anti-competitive conduct that they believe is justi149
fied on noneconomic policy grounds.
148.
149.

Carlson & Shepherd, supra note 7, at 601-03.
The so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes collective petitioning of a legisla-
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Collective petitioning for antitrust immunity for the horizontal price
fixing necessary to further social welfare objectives is preferable to price
fixing by economically self-interested universities to further their own
objectives. In this way, all affected parties, including students and athletes,
as well as those representing the public interest, will have a voice in appropriately balancing the effects of eliminating university price competition for
elite students and athletes.
X.

CONCLUSION

University recruiting for elite students and athletes is a commercial
activity that should be subject to traditional antitrust analysis. Agreements
to eliminate price competition for talented students and athletes have clear
anti-competitive effects. There are no legitimate pro-competitive economic
justifications for associations of universities with market power to prohibit
their members from independently determining the amount and nature of
financial incentives to offer coveted students and athletes that cannot be
achieved by substantially less restrictive means. If the normal operation of
free market forces does not achieve or advance desired noneconomic social
welfare objectives, Congress should determine whether university collaboration should displace price competition for students and athletes.

tive body for an anti-competitive purpose. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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